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Writing is a deep practice. Even before we begin writing, during 
whatever we are doing—gardening or sweeping the floor—our 
book or essay is being written deep in our consciousness. To write 
a book, we must write with our whole life, not just during the 
moments we are sitting at our desks.
Thich Nhat Hanh (1998, 91)
There is a story in every line of theory.
Lee Maracle (1990, 7)
Let me begin with a story.
During my first semester of graduate school, I took a course on embod-
ied learning with Roxana Ng. One of the course requirements was that 
we keep a journal, comprising both responses to the course readings and 
reflections upon our experience of qigong, a traditional Chinese practice 
that was central to the course curriculum. In one of my final journal entries, 
I wrote that I would have liked a more explicit antiracist theoretical frame-
work through which to engage with course content. While my comment was 
intended to highlight the importance of politicizing knowledge production 
when learning about Indigenous health and healing systems, it also betrays 
the limitations of my perspective at the time—that is, the extent to which my 
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understanding of antiracism and critical pedagogy was located within the 
realm of an activist-academic approach that privileges the mind and intel-
lect, often at the expense (or erasure) of our bodies and of bodily knowledge.
In her response, Ng acknowledged my critique but made a political asser-
tion of her own. In the margins of my course paper, she wrote, “I believe 
that profound shifts must come from self-reflection and interrogation, not 
just from intellectual understanding.” While I agreed with her about the 
importance of self-reflection and interrogation, at the time I understood 
these as primarily intellectual activities, and I recall insisting (to myself) 
that we need theory and analysis if we are to do our politics properly. I later 
came to realize that Ng was suggesting a different kind of reflection and 
interrogation, however—one that calls into question the very foundations 
of Western academic knowledge production.
It took several years of engagement with mindfulness meditation and a 
variety of other bodywork practices—which share among them an atten-
tiveness to the different dimensions of bodily life—for me to fully appreciate 
the significance of Ng’s assertion that personal and social transformation are 
intertwined processes that cannot be accomplished through analysis alone. 
Through working with a chronic pain condition and holding this embodied 
process in conversation with the work of writing and theorizing the body in 
knowledge production, I came to a deep awareness of how body and culture 
are fully imbricated; how history in its many manifestations lodges itself in 
the body. As I learned to attend to my body and expand the frameworks I 
was using to understand the nature of pain, and bodily life in general, I also 
discovered that our epistemological locations matter a great deal.
This notion of location, coupled with a concern with how we orient 
ourselves toward bodily knowledge and experience, and to what effect, 
became a key theme in my work. In particular, I became interested in how 
our epistemological locations—that is, those theoretical, discursive, and 
methodological frameworks through which we approach our practices of 
knowledge making—shape, and often delimit, the very possibilities of cri-
tique. Given my broader commitment to decolonizing methodologies, I 
also took my interest in embodiment and social theory as an occasion to 
explore the boundaries of critique and, conversely, the opportunities opened 
up by working through and across those boundaries. By tracing dominant 
Western, medicalized understandings of the body across social theories of 
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pain and embodiment, I was able to appreciate both the social and historical 
specificity of these theories and their relationship to wider histories of col-
onial knowledge production, and in so doing, to establish their contingency. 
In order to disrupt these dominant, taken-for-granted ways of knowing 
about pain and embodiment, however, I ultimately needed to reach outside 
common Western research methods and cultivate an approach that could 
help me to “suspend inherited habits of knowing,” as feminist scholar Jacqui 
Alexander (2005, 310) puts it, and centre the body within my writing and 
research.
It was through mindfulness practice that I was able to cultivate a dif-
ferent way of knowing about the body, through the body, which allowed 
me to read and write the body differently than I had before. I came to 
understand my approach as a form of embodied writing practice, and I 
began to read widely, across different disciplines and literatures, in search 
of other examples of embodied writing practices. Embodied writing, as I 
have come to conceptualize it, refers to the complex interplay between those 
discursive and material practices of reading, writing, and research that reach 
beyond Western objectivist and normalizing representations of the body 
and that instead seek to animate the body, and bodily diversity, such that 
representations of embodiment emerge through bodily subjectivity itself. 
Embodied writing, then, is writing that embraces open-ended, intertextual, 
and intersubjective representations of embodiment and that acknowledges 
both differently located bodies and diverse conceptual frameworks for 
understanding embodiment.
The remainder of this chapter explores the possibilities of embodied 
writing for social research and its implications for decolonizing knowledge 
production about and of the body. Beginning with the understanding that 
writing is a key, but contested, site of knowledge production in Western 
society (Richardson 2004; Smith 1999), I treat writing as a social and bodily 
practice. Using an examination of the social production of bodily pain to 
exemplify my approach, I describe how feminist autobiography, mindful-
ness meditation, and phenomenologically informed interpretive sociology 
can be brought together to foster an embodied writing practice.
After mapping my methodological approach, I turn to Lata Mani’s 
(2001) memoir of pain and disability, Interleaves, to illustrate what I mean 
by embodied writing and to explore its potential to shape bodily knowledge 
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production that treats the experience of pain as a social activity mediated 
by discursive and material processes that move among and across various 
disciplinary, historical, temporal, and corporeal boundaries. I suggest that 
through her use of mindfulness meditation, embodied narrative strategies, 
and textual practices that disrupt dominant Western academic writing con-
ventions, Lata Mani’s work represents the possibility of writing through 
pain and disability toward a space of decolonizing and liberatory praxis. In 
closing, I return to my argument that by attending to our epistemological 
locations, which are themselves always deeply political, we might open up 
opportunities to generate differently imagined relations to embodiment 
and, in turn, develop creative methodological and pedagogical practices 
that seek to engage, rather than negate, embodied difference.
Throughout the chapter, I also reflexively engage my own narrative of 
living with and writing through pain and disability, revealing that an embod-
ied writing practice is also a pedagogical practice. Here I am taking a broad 
understanding of pedagogy, recognizing that any practice of knowledge 
production also involves teaching ourselves (Alexander 2005). If writing is 
a process of coming to know, as I believe it is, then surely there is a peda-
gogical imperative within all scholarly writing, and especially within writing 
that seeks to engage one’s own narrative and experience, as mine does. As 
Chandra Mohanty (2003) notes, it is in fact experience that makes critical 
theory possible—we turn to theory to make meaning of our experience, 
connect this experience to wider social and political histories, and, in turn, 
shape new theories and understandings. Furthermore, Mohanty (2003) 
argues, we must understand these emergent knowledges “pedagogically” 
and take them up as a form of practice if we are to genuinely intervene in 
dominant structures of knowing. This is, then, to also recognize that our 
scholarly and pedagogical practices inform one another. And while I would 
argue that methodology is always to some degree pedagogical, this is espe-
cially true for those of us involved in education insofar as we teach from our 
experience, our research, our theoretical and political commitments—and, 
conversely, we research, write, and learn from how and what we teach. This 
is consistent with Indigenous research and educational practices, which do 
not impose rigid distinctions between narrative, experience, knowledge 
production, and pedagogy (Smith 1999).
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In this chapter, my approach mobilizes and makes explicit the recipro-
cal relationship between methodology and pedagogy through my use of 
feminist autobiography and autoethnography: I trace my own narrative 
throughout this work as it anticipated, informed, engaged, and intersected 
with my scholarly inquiries. In particular, I make my writing process vis-
ible throughout the work as a way to ground my argument in practice. In 
so doing, I hope to intervene in normative bodily relations to text as they 
are typically manifested through academic writing conventions such that I 
might exemplify to readers not just what I mean to say but how it might be 
accomplished. Embodied writing, then, necessarily resists the closure and 
coherence that much traditional academic writing seeks to achieve. One 
way to decolonize knowledge production through our writing practices, I 
argue in this chapter, is to highlight the provisional nature of writing and 
the very (embodied) process of coming to know. I begin with the body and 
social theory.
Writing the Body
Writing is central to Western education, knowledge production, and social 
research methodologies. Writing is also a political activity. As Maori scholar 
Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999, 36) reminds us, academic writing and its role 
in the generation of theory is never “innocent” (see also Maracle 1990). 
However, at the same time as it carries with it a legitimacy reflective of 
wider social histories of Western knowledge production, imperialism, and 
domination (Smith 1999), writing can also represent a politicizing space 
through which to contest, reflect upon, and rewrite hegemonic narratives 
(Mohanty 2003). Sheila Stewart’s essay in this collection provides an example 
of embodied writing that resists the closure typical of academic language, 
argumentation, and structure.
While the significance of writing to social inquiry and the possibilities 
offered by nontraditional forms of writing have been well-documented (see, 
for example, Clifford 1983; Richardson 2004), the relationship between the 
body and our writing practices has been given less attention. Although 
feminist scholarship, in particular, has moved to redress the mind-body 
split characteristic of social science research through an acknowledgement 
of the researcher as an experiencing subject, an examination of the ways in 
which writing is both a social and a bodily activity remains curiously absent.
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As Thomas Csordas (1994, 4) noted some twenty-five years ago, social 
theories of embodiment have likewise taken up their subject matter “with-
out much sense of ‘bodiliness.’” This often remains the case. Although the 
body has come to occupy considerable space within disciplines such as 
women’s studies, sociology, and education, theories of embodiment often 
reproduce dominant bodily relations to knowledge production through 
their emphasis on the body as a site of representation and their reliance upon 
normative notions of embodiment: rarely, for example, does the ill body, the 
body in pain, the disabled body appear, and when it does, it is most often 
as an anomaly or negation (Garland-Thomson 1997). As Csordas (1994, 4) 
argues, the lack of “bodiliness” in theories of embodiment has consequences 
for knowledge production about and of the body:
This tendency carries the dual dangers of dissipating the force of 
using the body as a methodological starting point, and of objectifying 
bodies as things devoid of intentionality and intersubjectivity. It thus 
misses the opportunity to add sentience and sensibility to our notions 
of self and person, and to insert an added dimension of materiality to 
our notions of culture and history.
And so while I have found social theories of the body, and particularly 
feminist accounts, indispensable to my understandings of embodiment, 
pain, and disability as always already in story, I am also cautious about 
the limitations, both political and epistemological, of approaches which 
employ those scholarly conventions that reproduce a disembodied relation 
to knowledge production.
Phenomenologically informed interpretive sociology is helpful here 
because it both highlights that writing is always already a social and bodily 
practice and can help to reveal the effects, scholarly and otherwise, of 
normative bodily relations to text. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (2004) phe-
nomenological work tells us, for example, that it is through our embodied 
perception of the world that our understandings take shape. It follows, then, 
that if writing is not merely a method of knowledge transmission but a 
process of knowing more deeply, then our writing practices are also medi-
ated by our embodiment. There is a tension here, however, for within the 
normative orders of Western academic knowledge production, we can also 
say that the inverse is true: our textual practices simultaneously mediate our 
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understandings of bodily life. This is to say that when we write, we write 
something into being; the form this writing takes thus writes, and indeed 
rewrites, an embodied relation to the world as it is represented in the text. 
This complex interplay points to a dynamic relation between body and form, 
which can be traced through the embodied and narrative strategies we put 
to work in our writing and theorizing.
By reflexively attending to the practices of reading and writing that shape 
knowledge production about the body, it becomes possible to destabilize 
objectified representations of the body and begin to write diversity, com-
plexity, and intersubjectivity into our theories of embodiment and the 
knowledge that flows from them. Tanya Titchkosky (2007, 210–11) describes 
the relationship between embodiment and textual knowledge production 
in this way:
To know that the body is made manifest through our word-filled rela-
tions to embodiment actualized through our reading and writing of 
the body, is to know that any manifestation of language is an embod-
ied activity that might open us to something other than what appears 
on the page. Reading and writing are socially oriented activities of 
embodied actors situated in the same world they are busy making. 
Attending not only to the sense in which texts give us versions of 
embodiment, but also to the ways in which we apperceive these ver-
sions, can teach us much about the ordering of relations to the bodies 
of ourselves and others through the medium of everyday texts.
This suggests that experiences of embodiment such as pain and disability 
are firmly located within those cultural contexts that give meaning to those 
experiences; in reading and writing any bodily experience we necessarily 
engage in interpretive work that involves the use of wider social narratives 
through which many different versions of embodiment are constructed. 
Embodiment is thus an intersubjective phenomenon, accomplished through 
social interactions and practices which reveal, as Gail Weiss (1999, 5–6) tells 
us, that “the experience of being embodied is never a private affair.” I am 
interested, then, in what bearing this interpretive approach has on the ways 
we read and write the body in pain, particularly given that bodily pain is 
most typically characterized as intensely private, subjective, and individual 
by nature (see, for example, Bonica 1990, 18; Scarry 1985, 4).
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Reading and Writing the Body in Pain: Or, the Discursive Limits 
of Critique
Pain is an extraordinarily common yet varied human experience. It is one 
way in which our bodies communicate with us and is present in our lan-
guage, appearing often in daily life and conversation as a metaphor for that 
which is difficult or undesirable. Pain is the object of medical knowledge 
and practice and is a commodity of the medical-pharmaceutical-industrial 
complex. Pain is also an emotional experience and is used often as a narra-
tive device in the stories we tell about the world. Pain appears in film, media, 
and advertising; in books ranging from fiction and memoir to medical texts 
and popular health books; in doctor’s offices and clinic waiting rooms; and 
in medical charts, questionnaires, and test reports. If we are attentive, we 
will notice pain all around us.
And yet pain is also nowhere. We feel it but we often do not talk about 
it, and we generally wish it would go away. It cannot be objectively seen 
or measured, and it regularly evades explanation and resolution by medi-
cine, which subsequently seeks to suppress it. Pain often evades language, 
and thus, while pain is often evoked metaphorically, it is much less often 
described. We avoid pain, have difficulty acknowledging pain, and often 
retreat in the face of the pain of others.
And so pain is both here and not here. An integral part of our daily lives 
as embodied beings yet also a space of silence and absence. Despite the very 
common experience of pain, it is most often narrated as a sign of anomaly, 
concern, even crisis—requiring and yet defying explanation. This interplay 
between the presence and absence of pain is revealing, because it suggests 
that pain is a socially produced phenomenon, always already in story, part 
of an ongoing and incomplete relation to embodiment. Brian Pronger (2002, 
80) writes of absence and the work it does: “Absence lies before presence, 
in anticipation. Just as absence lies in the foreground of presence, so too 
presence lies in the anticipation of absence. . . . Absence must receive pres-
ence, or there will be no making present.” Pain is thus made and unmade 
through the conditions and locations of its appearance; the absence of pain 
grounds, indeed constitutes, its presence, while the presence of pain desires 
its absence. The commonsensical understanding of pain as troublesome 
and undesirable needs, then, to be understood through an analysis of the 
conditions of possibility enabling its appearance in order to reveal both 
sharing breath doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771991919.01
Susan Ferguson 331
how it works as a socially produced phenomenon and the work it is doing. 
Let us now examine the language of pain and its dominant discursive rep-
resentation in Western society—that of medical discourse.
The word pain can be traced to the Greek and Latin words meaning 
punishment—poinḗ and poena, respectively (Bonica 1990, 18). The rep-
resentation of pain through language is thus underwritten by the notion 
that it is an undesirable response to a transgression of some kind. The Inter-
national Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) similarly defines pain as 
“an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage or described in terms of such damage.” As a note 
following this definition indicates, pain is “always subjective,” and while “it 
is unquestionably a sensation in a part or parts of the body,” pain is “always 
unpleasant and therefore also an emotional experience.”1
This common medical definition of pain reflects both the etymology of 
the word and dominant social understandings of bodily pain as troublesome 
and undesirable. While the reference to the emotional dimensions of the 
pain experience (assuming that the physical and emotional body can be held 
in separation) acknowledges that pain is more than just a physical sensation, 
pain ultimately derives its explanatory power through its biological facti-
city, as evidenced by the reference to tissue damage in the above medical 
definition. Interestingly, at the same time as medicine claims authority over 
pain—and even over its very existence—this definition also provides a kind 
of escape clause in suggesting that pain might only be “described in terms 
of such damage” (my emphasis) but still be diagnosed as pain.
The tenuousness of the diagnostic process in determining and treat-
ing pain, and particularly chronic pain, is well documented (for example, 
Good et al. 1992; Wainwright et al. 2006). Scientific theories of pain within 
Western medicine have undergone a number of changes (Kugelmann 1997, 
45), pointing to the indeterminacy of medicine’s explanatory models for 
1 See IASP Taxonomy Working Group, Classification of Chronic Pain, 2nd edition 
(revised), part 3, “Pain Terms: A Current List with Definitions and Notes on Usage,” 
http://www.iasp-pain.org/files/Content/ContentFolders/Publications2/Classifica-
tionofChronicPain/Part_III-PainTerms.pdf, 3. The second edition of this standard 
reference work was published in 1994; the revised, online edition incorporates 
updates dating to 2011 and 2012. The full text is available on the IASP website at 
http://www.iasp-pain.org/PublicationsNews/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1673&na-
vItemNumber=677.
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understanding pain. In modern times, a major shift occurred when pain 
ceased to be treated as a sensation, the dominant approach until around 
1950, and instead came to be understood primarily through Melzack and 
Wall’s “gate control theory” (Kugelmann 1997). Mirroring the shift from 
biomedical to biopsychosocial approaches to health—which recognize 
individual health not as solely biological but as a complex of interactions 
between the biological, psychological, and social aspects of human life—
the gate control theory shifted dominant Western medical conceptions 
of pain from understanding it as a signal to understanding it as a process 
within the human body (54). While the former model understood pain as 
a physiological reaction to injury mediated by specific nerves (55), Mel-
zack and Wall’s gate control theory of pain emerged in response to the 
“puzzle” of pain and the apparently inconsistent relationship between the 
existence of pain and (verifiable) injury (Melzack and Wall 1988, 3). This 
is a pain that attempts to acknowledge variety, cultural context, the role 
of language in describing pain, and the impact of personal history on 
the experience of pain; for Melzack and Wall, all these subjective dimen-
sions to pain refuted any direct relation between injury and sensation and 
demanded a new definition and approach to understanding pain itself 
(12–14). This new definition ultimately signalled a key shift away from 
treating pain as a symptom toward treating pain as an illness unto itself 
(Baszanger 1998, 122).
Medical theories and definitions of pain do not simply reside in medical 
textbooks, however. Rather, they circulate and make their way into daily life 
through both medical practices that seek to treat the illness of pain and the 
many ways in which medical discourse permeates different arenas of West-
ern social life. The practice of clinical medicine strongly shaped Melzack and 
Wall’s theory of pain, and a major contribution of the gate control model was 
the measurement tool they developed to improve the treatment of pain—the 
McGill Pain Questionnaire, which asks the patient to rate the intensity and 
qualities of the pain they are experiencing. This questionnaire is widely used 
as a way of assessing what type of pain a person may be experiencing and is 
regarded as a way of bridging the very personal, subjective nature of pain 
with the objective needs of Western medical treatment regimes (Melzack 
and Wall 1988, 41). In shifting pain from a sensation with a singular source 
within the body to a process with multiple pathways throughout the body, 
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the possibilities for pain treatment were also expanded. In this model, there 
are two different pathways through which pain may be treated: intervening 
in organic structures of the body and intervening in mental processes. A 
wide variety of treatment modalities, including alternative or complement-
ary treatments, were thus legitimated for use in the medical treatment of 
pain (Baszanger 1998).
This overview of the dominant Western biomedical understanding of 
pain is by no means comprehensive. What I hope it demonstrates, though, 
is that pain is a contested space. And yet, despite the indeterminacy of 
knowledge about pain in Western society, pain tends to remain within the 
objectivist authority of medical science. By attending to the language of pain 
in the definition above, however, and the theories of pain and embodiment 
that it reflects, we can better understand how pain gains its sensibility and 
secures its facticity as a medicalized phenomenon.
Pain, the accepted medical definition above tells us, needs language to 
enter medicine; pain needs to be described. As Emma Whelan (2003, 477) 
argues, “There is no medical way into pain except via patient subjectivity, 
however much some medical experts may want to minimize the role of sub-
jectivity in medical claimsmaking processes.” This is especially true if pain 
is to be treated. The act of describing pain, however, facilitates a slippage 
between the subjective description of sensory experience that is labelled 
as pain and the diagnosis of damage that is said to produce the pain. Even 
when there is no observable evidence of injury, as is often the case, pain 
is understood by medicine as a transgression of the body; something has 
happened to the body. (Indeed, the demand of pain’s absence is often the 
very thing that makes it present.) And so while pain is acknowledged to be 
experiential, emotional, and subjective, requiring language to gain its sens-
ibility, the epistemological move that links pain with medical treatment has 
the effect of securing the body as the body-object—that is, the body known 
objectively by science—thereby foreclosing other ways of understanding 
the body and the body in pain. This is one way in which medicine works to 
position itself as science despite its reliance on interpretive practices (Good 
and Good 1993).
The continuities and paradoxes among different conceptualizations of 
pain also reveal it to be an interpreted phenomenon, achieved through com-
plex, interactive, and often conflicting processes of knowledge production. 
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Notably, the interactions that produce pain as a medical scientific phe-
nomenon are profoundly social—they occur between bodies. Despite the 
dominant characterization of pain as deeply individual, it is only through 
engagement with another, and with the social, that pain is given its meaning 
as pain. By this, I do not simply mean to say that our experiences of pain, 
like illness, have meaning in our own lives, as some scholars have suggested 
in an attempt to intervene in medical discourse (Kleinman 1988); rather, I 
mean that the very conditions of pain’s appearance precede and inflect the 
experience of pain itself. In this sense, pain is only pain—only becomes pain, 
perhaps—in the midst of others.
By highlighting the social production of pain, I am not seeking to deny 
or dismiss the painful experience that most often is pain. Indeed, my work 
on this subject was, for a long time, shaped by my desire to not be in pain. 
Rather, I want to trouble those Western epistemological practices that 
produce pain as only ever one possible sensation or experience. This is 
important because not only does Western medical discourse delineate the 
boundaries of knowledge production about pain and the body, but these 
discursive boundaries also limit the possibilities of critique if we take these 
boundaries for granted and perform our scholarly work within them. To 
deny that we are always already engaged in meaning-making about pain 
and the body is thus to deny that meaning-making is always political. 
This is especially problematic when meaning masquerades as an objective 
truth, or that which “just is.” And so, by treating pain as a socially pro-
duced phenomenon, I am concerned not only with intervening in those 
dominant medicalized understandings of pain that circumscribe the dis-
cursive boundaries of pain but also with the epistemological implications 
of taking Western medicalized discourses of pain and embodiment as 
self-evident. Indeed, as Judith Butler (2004, 4) reminds us, critique often 
emerges from those tenuous spaces between the dominant discourses 
and practices through which we know ourselves and the ways in which 
our experience exceeds the structures of knowing available to us. Our 
embodied experiences and perceptions are one such example. For critique 
to be transformative, however, it must reach beyond those structures of 
“settled knowledge” (27) towards the possibility of different ways of being 
in the world.
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Writing and Rewriting the Body in Pain: Toward an Embodied 
Writing Practice
As I described earlier in this chapter, my interest in developing an embod-
ied writing practice was motivated by a desire to animate the body within 
my writing and research and disrupt normative bodily relations to know-
ledge production—a desire that acquired a kind of critical urgency when I 
developed a physical impairment that profoundly affected my ability to pro-
duce written text and thus to participate in academic knowledge production. 
As Roxana Ng (2004) notes, our bodies are an integral but taken-for-granted 
aspect of our intellectual work; for me, the reciprocal relationship between 
my body and my scholarly work only became clear to me when I suddenly 
found that I could not write and was unable to participate in the intellectual 
work of the university (Ferguson and Titchkosky 2008). Disability and its 
intervention into my experience of typical bodily relations to writing thus 
shaped my interest in exploring how an embodied writing practice can 
intervene in those dominant epistemological practices that serve to secure 
the authority of particular bodies of knowledge and recognize only particu-
lar bodies as knowledgeable.
My commitment to embodied writing—particularly when it involved 
myself—initially remained quite intellectual insofar as I did not know how 
to know through any other means. Mindfulness practice helped me cul-
tivate a different way of knowing about the body, through the body. My 
body. (And this was very important, because it allowed me to reach outside 
an objectified relation to embodiment and write the body’s subjectivity.) I 
began to experience my body, and in particular the pain I lived with, quite 
differently. My sensory experience became more nuanced and the bound-
aries of my perception of my embodiment more expansive. I became at once 
more conscious of my sensory experience and, because I was more aware 
of the variety and changeability of this experience, less invested in it and its 
(possible) meaning or significance. Pain became part of a much broader set 
of sensory experiences than it had been for me in the past.
Knowing that I could experience my body differently was a profound 
confirmation that the body is indeed socially produced (Butler 1993). While 
I had previously been committed to this perspective, I came to understand 
this at the level of bodily experience (itself an interpretive process) and not 
solely as an intellectual interest in social theories of embodiment. During 
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this time, I also began to explore the potential for embodied writing to 
support a project of decolonizing knowledge production. Colonial histories 
continue to shape the social organization of knowledge; colonialism is not 
just a political and economic project that occurred in the past but is part 
of ongoing social and geopolitical formations that structure discourse in 
the present. Decolonization, then, does not only require a radical recon-
ceptualization of human relationships to land and each other, including 
the return of land to Indigenous peoples (though this, too, is essential; see 
Tuck and Yang 2012); it also demands that we interrogate those knowledge 
systems founded upon colonial ideologies and the practices of exclusion 
that flow from them. Indeed, the discursive practices of colonialism have 
profoundly material effects, and it is critical that we recognize the ways in 
which the material and discursive are mutually constitutive. Within this 
context, I became interested in how various forms of dualistic thinking 
that rest upon colonial ideologies prohibit more integrative approaches to 
knowledge production and, more specifically, in tracing how this inflects 
writing as a site of epistemological practice.
Recalling my opening narrative, I returned to Ng’s assertion that if 
critical reflection is to be put to the service of social transformation, it must 
be an embodied activity. In her work on embodied pedagogy, or embod-
ied learning (2000a, 2000b, 2004, 2011), Ng argues that oppressive social 
relations are upheld by the division between the mind/intellect and body/
spirit that is foundational to Western education and knowledge production. 
This leads to a disjuncture between analysis and practice, or “way of being 
in the world” (2004, 3). Even (or perhaps especially) critical education, 
with its explicit social justice agenda, tends to reproduce this disjuncture 
through its emphasis on critical thinking at the expense of embodied or 
spiritual understanding. Ng’s (2004) model of embodied pedagogy seeks to 
redress this disjuncture through an integrative praxis that highlights Eastern 
health and meditation practices in the classroom as a way of disrupting 
the mind-body split and facilitating students’ capacity for embodied (self-)
reflection and critical insight. (For an example of how mindfulness-based 
pedagogy can foster critical reflection in social work education, see Yuk-Lin 
Renita Wong’s essay in this collection.) Jacqui Alexander (2005) similarly 
charts a relationship between colonization and systems of dualistic think-
ing, arguing that the work of decolonization requires a critically engaged, 
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integrative approach that bridges the secular and the spiritual and is prem-
ised on a dynamic relation between radical self-determination and collective 
interdependence. Alexander’s insistence upon recognizing the spiritual in 
our practices of knowledge production is echoed in Temitope Adefarakan’s 
chapter in this volume, where she argues that we must recognize that stu-
dents are not solely academic bodies but also spiritual bodies, as a strategy 
for resisting Eurocentric teaching practices that rest upon the bifurcation 
of mind/intellect and body/spirit.
Central to the work of decolonization, then, is the notion of practice 
and the possibility offered by integrative work that disrupts those hierarch-
ical dualisms that are foundational to Western social thought (mind/body, 
male/female, reason/affect, nature/culture, for example). This is to say that 
without pedagogical, methodological, and other practices to accompany 
the work of knowledge production, our theorizing cannot support a project 
of decolonization. Epistemologically, Ng’s (2004) approach is instructive 
because it allows for knowledge production about the body to take place 
through the body, thereby displacing the primacy of objectivist, scientific 
ways of knowing. Importantly, however, it also acts as a critical interven-
tion into Western philosophies of the body by providing a set of alternative 
theories and practices of the body. In doing so, this approach not only dem-
onstrates that the body is always already a space of interpretation (Butler 
1993) but also locates our social and cultural understandings of the body, and 
relationships to our bodies, within wider histories of colonial knowledge 
production. (See Wendy Peters’s chapter in this collection for a powerful 
example of an embodied narrative that similarly contests the dominance of 
Western medical knowledge.)
Philosopher Annemarie Mol (2002) suggests that we critically reflect 
upon how bodies are done through an analysis of those material practices 
that shape the experience and interpretation of bodily life. Mol warns of 
the risk involved in treating bodies as solely a space of interpretation and 
meaning-making, suggesting that “the body’s physical reality is still left out; 
it is yet again an unmarked category” (11). Methodologically, this insistence 
upon the intersections between those material and discursive boundaries 
shaping bodily life is important when theorizing embodied experiences such 
as pain because it thoroughly denaturalizes any embodied relation while at 
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the same time allowing for the recognition that theorizing has consequences 
that must be lived with.
Furthermore, as Mol (2002, vii) asserts, “Attending to enactment rather 
than knowledge has an important effect: what we think of as a single object 
may appear to be more than one.” It is this kind of multiplicity and com-
plexity that I sought to uncover regarding pain and the body, as a strategy 
for opening up the ways in which we experience and narrate our sensory 
experiences of pain and contesting dominant medical frameworks that 
discipline pain as an embodied phenomenon. I want now to take up Mol’s 
methodological proposal to explore the possibilities of embodied writing 
practices that reveal the multiplicity, intersubjectivity, and sociality of bodily 
pain and bodily life. In particular, I argue that mindfulness meditation offers 
one way of “doing” the body such that knowledge can be produced through 
the body and through bodily diversity.
Mindfulness Meditative Practice as Method
Mindfulness meditation is a central practice within Buddhism. While the 
term meditation actually refers to a variety of techniques developed over 
centuries, including different forms of yoga and sitting meditation, these 
practices share the aim of cultivating embodied awareness in the present 
moment (Orr 2002, 488). Most simply put, mindfulness meditation is about 
“paying attention” (Kabat-Zinn 2005, 21) without judgment. The most 
common means of mindfulness meditation practice involves using a stable 
and relaxed seated posture and breath work to ground us in our bodies 
such that we can be more aware of what we are feeling and experiencing 
(Rosenberg 1998). In this way, the practice of mindfulness creates a rela-
tionship of “witnessing” oneself and one’s body such that it fosters greater 
reflective awareness (Zhao 2006, 91). While this practice of paying attention 
can be developed through dedicated meditation time, mindfulness can also 
be taken into daily life through the cultivation of attentiveness to common 
activities such as walking, talking with others, and writing.
Mindfulness fosters a kind of attentiveness that aims to interrupt those 
cognitive thought patterns that lead us to narrate our experiences as we 
experience them. These “storylines,” as they are often called, are forms of 
received knowledge, acquired through our individual and social histories; 
mindfulness practice asks that we suspend what we think we know such 
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that we can experience our bodies and our selves more fully and deeply. 
Through heightened awareness of our feelings and sensations, mindfulness 
also helps to highlight the notion of impermanence—the idea that no par-
ticular state is permanent because the world is constantly changing. With 
this heightened awareness, we can clearly perceive the fluidity and variability 
of embodied experiences. This is particularly helpful when working with 
feelings or sensations that are generally understood to be troublesome or 
undesirable, such as pain.
I have found the practice of mindfulness meditation to be consistent 
with phenomenology through the shared emphasis on reflection, embodied 
awareness, and openness between self and other. (In fact, I began to appre-
ciate the methodological potential of mindfulness practice when the body 
work I was doing in my conscious movement classes began to resonate with 
the phenomenology I was reading at the time.) Methodologically, phenom-
enology involves sustained reflexive engagement with research material 
through an “attentive awareness” to the subject matter and to the world as 
it is lived rather than as it is theorized (van Manen 2006, 713). Marianne 
Paget (1993, 8) describes it in this way:
Phenomenological work involves both the subject’s experience and the 
phenomenologist’s experience. Experience means that which is lived 
through, Erlebnis. The subject or subject matter is not an object in the 
sense of a thing. The subject or subject matter is explored through the 
subjectivity of the phenomenologist who perceives the subject matter, 
the phenomena, as a dialectical relation between self-understanding 
and understanding the other. Work in this tradition is reflexive and 
tacks back and forth between the subject matter and observing the 
subject matter reflexively.
Meaning is thus co-created, and while it inevitably draws upon multiple hist-
ories and subjectivities, it also fosters a kind of reflective present/presence.
Larry Rosenberg (1998, 16), a Buddhist scholar and teacher based in the 
United States, describes mindfulness as a way of being intimate with the 
world as we experience our world. When we are mindful, he suggests, the 
distinctions we tend to create between self and other can dissolve. Simi-
larly, reflection in the phenomenological tradition is a way of “bringing 
into nearness that which tends to be obscure, that which tends to evade the 
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intelligibility of our natural attitude of everyday life” (van Manen 1990, 32). 
Mindfulness and phenomenology also share a commitment to openness of 
both the body and thought processes; they are not concerned with reflection 
as a form of truth-telling but rather with the cultivation of a reflexive prac-
tice that allows for sustained embodied engagement with and through the 
world. In this sense, mindfulness can help to achieve phenomenology’s hope 
for cultivating understanding through the recognition of the inseparability 
between subject and object, self and other.
Embodied Writing and the Social Production of Pain in Lata 
Mani’s Interleaves
Lata Mani’s (2001) autobiographical text, Interleaves, offers a good illustra-
tion of how mindfulness meditation can shape an embodied writing practice 
and thus act as an intervention into those normative writing conventions 
that position the body as subordinate to (and, in the case of disabled bodies, 
interfering with) the privileged work of the intellect. Lata Mani is a scholar, 
poet, and cultural critic. Formerly a professor at the University of California, 
Davis, Mani sustained a head injury as a result of a major car accident. In 
the author’s (2001, 73) own words, Interleaves
is about an individual’s journey through the social landscapes of our 
time, through the ways in which society constructs wellness, illness, 
success, failure, worth, worthlessness, as these are experienced by 
one woman attempting to live consciously through the trials and 
tribulations of brain injury. The social construction of illness meant 
that the rupture brought about by a physical disability and a medical 
emergency became also an existential crisis, one in which the broader 
questions of life and death, pain and suffering, belonging and outsider-
ness had to be confronted every day and, at times, with every breath.
The book is divided into two parts. Part 1, titled “The Journey,” consists of 
a series of ruminations, as the author calls them, on living with disability 
and chronic illness. Part 2, “Contemplations,” is a series of reflections on 
seven spiritual principles that the author developed as she learned to live 
through disability, pain, and suffering. The book blends narrative, critical 
reflection and poetry and makes use of a variety of different narrative and 
stylistic devices throughout.
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Interleaves is also available as an audio CD, reflecting the medium through 
which the book was written: the spoken word. Mani initially tape-recorded 
the text and then had it transcribed—a writing practice that was necessi-
tated by her embodied relationship to knowledge production. Following 
her car accident, Mani’s cognition occurred through hearing; she shared in 
media interviews that she was no longer able to read or engage in sustained, 
continuous narrative (Rao 2001). As a result, the narrative structure of the 
book is quite fluid, comprising relatively short and often overlapping chap-
ters that, when taken together, explore many different aspects of the social 
location of disability but do not build a comprehensive argument. Instead of 
offering traceable analytic trajectories or conclusions to anchor the various 
chapters, Mani shares with readers what she has learned from her experi-
ence of disability. However, these pedagogical reflections are themselves 
provisional because they are grounded in another embodied practice of 
knowledge production—meditation and breath work.
I want now to examine how the body in pain is being done (Mol 2002, 
31–32) in Interleaves and how this is accomplished through an embodied 
relationship to knowledge production as it is revealed within the text. The 
body as something we do is highlighted through the emphasis on reflections 
that have emerged through the embodied practice of meditation; in this 
sense, key meditation practices such as conscious breath work, observation 
without evaluation and attachment, and being present in the moment can 
also be understood methodologically. The text moves between description 
and discussion, but significantly, Mani returns the reader again and again to 
the present, to the embodied moment of reflection and the open possibilities 
of that reflexive space. This represents quite a different intention and tem-
porality than the progressive movement of modernist Western practices of 
knowledge production that gain authority through coherent, forward-facing 
narrative and theorizing. In contrast, this text uses a kind of reflective, inter-
subjective present as a space to consider the workings and sociality of the 
body, pain, and disability. So while Mani writes of the body, and of her body, 
throughout the text, she consistently writes this body knowledge through 
her embodied relationship to that knowledge, achieved through meditation 
practice, and with the reflexive sense that it could also be otherwise. This is 
exemplified in the following excerpt from Mani (2001, 26–27), drawn from 
a chapter titled “Pain”:
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Pain throbs. Pain shreds. Pain darts. Pain weaves sly patterns across 
the length and breadth of the body. Pain stabs. Pain pulses. Pain 
plummets the body into a vortex unknown and at times fearful. Pain 
nags. Chronic pain drones repetitiously, monotonously, ad nauseam. 
Pain flays the surface of the skin, turning it almost translucent with 
frailty. Pain makes one so weak that the whole world is experienced 
through its omnipresent filter. Pain drains everything into its core. 
Pain can be as focused as the point of a pinhead or as dispersed as 
one’s consciousness and, if suffered long enough, the pinpoint can 
seem to grow and swallow one’s entire physical being. Pain can be as 
hard as steel or as soft as a ripe pear. Pain shudders. Pain shivers.
Yet, to speak of pain like this is to suggest that it is an entity, a thing, 
when it is in fact something very difficult to grasp and hold. For when 
one does not resist pain so it pools, swirls, finds a crevice in the body 
in which to stay put, pain is revealed as a diaphanous energy perme-
able, dissolvable, transformable by breath. Pain, it turns out, is not an 
ice floe that must be hacked away, but a little pocket of stuck energy 
that can be released by softening, loosening, relaxing, by conscious 
breathing.
In this passage, knowledge about the body is certainly being produced. 
But this knowledge, much like embodied life itself, is represented as active, 
contradictory, and suggestive of other possibilities and experiences. This 
contingency is most clearly revealed through the break in the narrative, and 
narrative positioning, of pain’s description. Whereas the section begins with 
a direct rendering of pain as an embodied phenomenon, with the paragraph 
break, the narrative perspective shifts to a reflexive space, mirroring the 
process of mindfully working with pain as an embodied experience. While 
the dominant approach to pain understands it as negation and something to 
manage, suppress, and eliminate—something to be “hacked away”—Mani’s 
description suggests that through meditation, or “conscious breathing,” pain 
can also be something else.
Pain is thus represented as a relationship between people and their 
bodies, and as such, it is an intersubjective phenomenon—a social activity 
mediated by the discourses, practices, and other meaning-making devices 
available to us. (This is one way in which bodies are done.) Mani (2001) also 
offers us her own body work with breath and meditation and, in so doing, 
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contests medical discourses that seek to categorize, measure, and manage 
pain. (These are two more ways in which bodies are done.) Mani thereby 
writes the complexity, vulnerability, and social locatedness of embodied life 
into her narrative and her narrative practice, thus suggesting that one way 
of contesting those epistemological boundaries that represent bodily pain 
as somehow outside the social is to shift the very grounds of our theoretical 
and methodological approaches. (And here are many more ways in which 
bodies can be done.)
To feel pain, to live with pain, to be in pain is almost certainly accompan-
ied by the desire to not be in pain, in this world. I do not wish to question 
or negate that desire, even while I would like to unsettle it. What I do desire 
is that we pay attention to how the body in pain is being accomplished and 
what this can tell us about bodily norms and difference and the boundaries 
of knowledge production about and of the body. While this relation to pain 
as a desired and potential absence is present in Mani’s narrative above, I read 
this as a present-absent dialectic that exists among several different relations 
to bodily pain. In the text, pain is felt; pain is narrated; pain is written; pain 
is worded; pain is worked with; pain is held and pain is released; pain is 
theorized and pain is imagined. Perhaps most significantly, pain is both of 
the body and beyond it. Pain, when attended to with mindfulness, is a space 
of shifting, relational encounters with oneself and others. Pain will always 
exceed its narration.
Mani’s narrative also reveals the contingency and indeterminacy of 
knowledge production about pain and the body. Just as there are multiple 
relations to pain in the narrative above, so too are there multiple bodies—
her body writing, her body doing a mindfulness exercise, her body telling 
a story, to name a few. In attending to how the body is accomplished 
through different narrative practices, interpretive devices, and approaches 
to language, we can clearly appreciate both the multiplicity of the body 
and embodiment as a social phenomenon. In grounding her narrative in 
an embodied practice that reaches beyond dominant Western relations to 
both embodiment and writing, Lata Mani’s narrative disrupts the singular 
authority of medicalized Western knowledge production about pain and the 
body. In so doing, her embodied narrative practice opens up the possibility 
of cultivating bodily knowledge that is also resistant knowledge. Indeed, as 
Mani herself has commented, bringing a sense of spacious attentiveness to 
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our practices of investigation can foster understanding of both self and other 
that is “explicitly open to perceptual frames being liquefied or recast by the 
observational and experiential process” (Gunawardena 2011, 24).
Conclusion
In reorienting ourselves to our bodily knowledge, mindfulness meditation 
offers the possibility of generating not simply new knowledge or critique but, 
importantly, new ways of being in the world (Ng 2011). This was certainly 
my experience. What began as an academic interest in the most typical 
sense became an immersive inquiry into the very grounds of that interest. 
While this was precipitated by my own experience of pain and disability 
as it shaped my ability to write and participate in academic knowledge 
production, it was also informed by a deep commitment to decolonizing 
research and educational practices. Only by grounding my inquiry firmly 
within my embodied experience of (re)reading and (re)writing through pain 
and disability, however, as that experience was enabled by a mindfulness 
meditation practice, was I able to understand the depth of my investment 
in normative bodily relations to knowledge production such that I could 
begin to work at their edges and, at times, to reach beyond them.
As Butler (1999, 17) reminds us, dualistic thinking has important social 
effects—it is not merely an issue of philosophy in the abstract—for it “invari-
ably supports relations of political and psychic subordination and hierarchy.” 
Bringing together mindfulness meditative practice and phenomenological 
approaches to knowledge production to foster an embodied writing prac-
tice can help to decolonize the tendency toward dualistic thinking that is 
characteristic of Western social thought and shift the very grounds of our 
critiques such that the meanings and experiences of embodied phenomena 
like pain, disability, and embodied difference can be reimagined. To open 
ourselves up to different ways of understanding and experiencing bodily 
life thus constitutes an important intervention into those dominant West-
ern practices of knowledge production that reproduce hierarchies of social 
difference through their reliance upon understandings of embodiment and 
subjectivity that are underwritten by the mind-body split and other forms 
of dualistic thinking.
When taken up in the service of social transformation, embodied writing 
can support a project of decolonization when it intervenes in those academic 
sharing breath doi: 10.15215/aupress/9781771991919.01
Susan Ferguson 345
conventions that discipline our scholarly practices such that colonial dis-
courses of Western modernity retain their grip on our imaginations and 
our theorizing. Bringing mindfulness together with writing as an embodied 
practice is suggestive of liberatory possibility, then, insofar as it summons 
marginalized knowledge and experience (Alexander 2005) and opens up 
our writing, and the stories we tell, to allow for the presence of embodied 
and textual difference.
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